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CULTIWATING A SEEDLING CHARTER: SOUTH AFRICA'S
COURT GROWS ITS CONSTITUTION
MargaretA. Burnham*
As South Africa emerges from the vestiges of apartheid,its Constitutional
Court strugglesto develop ajurisprudencethat reflects the lasting ideals of
a constitutional democracy. This Article examines the Court's use of
internationalandforeign law in developinga uniqueform ofconstitutional
jurisprudence.It argues that the ConstitutionalCourt is in the process of
developing an innovativeform of decision-makingthat effectively combines
domestically derived principles of justice with those developed in the
internationalforum. This Article concludes that reliable methods of
adjudicationarefirmly entrenched in the South African legal system and
that its constitutionaljurisprudence should serve as a model for other
democraticsystems.
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No one gives us rights. We win them in struggle. They exist in our
hearts before they exist on paper. Yet intellectual struggle is one of
the most important areas of the battle for rights. It is through
concepts that we link our dreams to the acts of daily lIfe.'
INTRODUCTION
As South Africa wends its way through the difficult passage
from apartheid to a multiracial democracy, its new Constitutional
* Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Partner, Burnham & Hines, Boston, Massachusetts. I thank the Michigan
Journal of Race & Law editors for their foresight and energy in convening the
symposium, "Constitution-Making in South Africa" (Mar. 21-22, 1997), at which I
presented an earlier version of this work. Especially, I thank editors Kelly
Whiting, Myriam Jaidi, and Jane Messmer, who provided invaluable assistance
with this Article.
1. ALBIE SACHS, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS INA NEW SOUTH AFRICA vii (1990).
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Court is carving out a critical role for itself. The Court must now
spell out the details of those rights "won in struggle" for which
Albie Sachs, one its eleven jurists, and others fought. In construing a
constitutional text that many of its members helped to construct, the
Court is searching for a balance between the immediate need for
policy guidance on contentious matters arising from the dismantling
of apartheid and the creation of enduring doctrinal principles.
Established under the terms of South Africa's first democratic
Constitution 2-the interim Constitution of 1994-the Constitutional
Court held its first sitting in February 1995. The creation of a Constitutional Court3 vested with the power of judicial review
represents a break with the past that is both symbolic and pragmatic. Deeply committed to the status quo, the old South African

2. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, effective in February 1997,
was created by the Constitutional Assembly. There were four previous Constitutions
in South Africa. The South Africa Act of 1909, which constituted the Union of South
Africa, granted political rights to Whites and Cape Coloreds only. See §§ 26(b), 34(i),
35(1) of South Africa Act of 1909. The Constitution of 1961 limited political rights to
Whites only. See S. AFR. CONST. of 1961 §§ 43, 46(c). The Constitution of 1983 created a
tricameral parliament that extended nominal rights to Coloreds and Indians, excluded
Africans, and kept real power in the hands of Whites. See S. AFR. CONST. of 1983 §§ 39,
54, 55. See generally Johan van der Vyver, Depriving Westminster of its Moral Constraints: A Survey of Constitutional Development in South Africa, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 291 (1985). Between April 1994, when the first all-race elections took place, and
the adoption of the current Constitution in February 1997, the country was governed
by the interim Constitution of 1994, which established the Constitutional Assembly
and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Assembly adopted the new Constitution in May 1996; it was then reviewed by the Constitutional Court. The Court issued a
decision that the text adopted by the Constitutional Assembly in May 1996 could not
be certified. Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4)
SALR 744 (CC). On October 11, 1996, the Constitutional Assembly adopted an
amended text to conform with the Court's ruling. This text was again reviewed by the
Constitutional Court, which, with its decision in Certificationof the Amended Text of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 1997 (2) SALR 97 (CC), approved the
new draft and certified that the text satisfied the requirements of the Constitutional
Principles that formed the basis of the negotiated political settlement leading up to the
1994 election.
3. Section 167 of the Constitution provides for the creation of the Constitutional
Court. See S. AFR. CONST. § 167. The creation of the Court signaled the end of parliamentary sovereignty in South Africa. Under that doctrine, the courts could not strike
down enactments of Parliament and there was neither judicial review of such legislation nor a bill of rights constitutionally limiting government intrusion upon civil rights.
See, e.g., ALBIE SACHS, JUSTICE INSOUTH AFRICA 132 (1981) (examining the practical
application of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty); Joshua Davidson, Note, The
History of Judicial Oversight of Legislative and Executive Action in South Africa, 8 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 687 (1985) (exploring the practical application and other considerations stemming from the principle of parliamentary sovereignty).
4. Only a new institution could be entrusted faithfully to apply the new
Constitution that is itself both a symbol and a vehicle for change:
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judiciary realistically could not be entrusted to grant full consideration to the provisions of the new Constitution, or to include all
citizens within the provisions' purview.5 In contrast, the new Court
reflects the divergent voices of South African society. As specified
by the Constitution, eleven judges comprise the Court.6 Currently,
four Black men and two women, one of whom is also Black, serve on
7 All judges serve for non-renewable terms of twelve
the Court.
8
years.
If constitutional adjudication were to become an effective
partner in the social transformation envisioned by the Constitution,
the text first would require implementation of new judicial
leadership empowered with broad authority. To that end, the Court
appears committed to a vision of judicial activism that reflects the
democratic and human rights ideals embodied in the general
constitutional language. As part of this process, the Court has
tackled problematic questions of rights enforcement in
constitutional adjudication, questions that have engendered
many years of commentary by critical legal scholars. 9 While it is far

[albove all, the Constitution is a vehicle for expressing fundamental notions of freedom, at the conceptual, symbolic, and practical levels.... An
effective bill of rights can become a major instrument of nation-building.
It can secure for the mass of people a sense that life has really changed,
that there will be no return to the oppressive ways of apartheid society.
ALBIE SACHS, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NEW SOUTH AFRICA 189 (1990).
5. See, e.g., JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL

ORDER (1978) (examining the features of the South African legal order as of 1977);
DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW IN
THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 49-51 (1991) (describing the history of an

acquiescing South African Judiciary); Lynn Berat, Courting Justice: A Call for Judicial
Activism in a Transformed South Africa, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 849 (1993) (arguing that
South Africa's history of judicial conservatism must give way to activism); Lynn Berat,
The South African Judiciary and the Protection of Human Rights: A Strategy for a New
South Africa, 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 181 (1991) (suggesting a pro-human rights
approach for the South African judiciary); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in
American and South African Courts: Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479,
514-21 (1990) [hereinafter Racism] (describing South Africa's history of judicial
racism); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Seeking Pluralism in Judicial Systems: The American
Experience and the South African Challenge, 42 DUKE L.J. 1028 (1993) (examining the
problems inherent in a judiciary not reflective of a nation's population and suggesting
that South Africa's judiciary adopt pluralism as a means of promoting justice).
6. S. AFR. CONST. § 167(1).
7. For a description of how the jurists were selected and their background, see
Brice Dickson, South Africa's Constitutional Court, 145 NEW L.J. 246 (1995).
8. S. AFR. CONST. § 176(1).
9. On the question of whether constitutional adjudication is an ineffective means
of enlarging political and social rights to meet human needs, see MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 289-311

(1990); Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
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too early for a conclusive reading of the Court's contributions to the
monumental changes taking place in the country, the fact that
several of the Court's jurists, like Sachs, contributed both to the
political struggle leading up to the new Constitution as well as to the
actual drafting of the document itself, has profoundly influenced the
Court's vision of its own role in the delicate transformation now
taking place.
Analysis of a number of the Court's rulings indicates that the
Court has already established itself as an innovative voice in the
country's new constitutional democracy. The Constitution provides
that eight judges are sufficient to hear a matter;0 however, in
practice all eleven judges hear every case. The Court's decisions,
which are at times long and discursive, have included extensive
minority opinions. Perhaps hoping to foreclose the possibility that a
disaffected population may not continue to support judicial
enforcement of human rights and social justice standards once the
honeymoon period presently enjoyed by the Court and other new
government institutions ultimately draws to a close, the Court has
moved quickly to place its voice among the country's new political
structures and to generate public support for its role. To this end, the
Court has addressed itself to many of the constitutional silences
bequeathed to it by the Constitutional Assembly that created the
text, while at the same time seeking to define its own role in the
transition to democracy. As a result, the Constitutional Court's
decisions provide a provocative model of an unabashedly
progressive, value-laden jurisprudence for the South African
judiciary and, indeed, the world.
This Article examines a number of areas of the Constitutional
Court's jurisprudence that, I argue, demonstrate its singular importance to other states seeking to identify the role of classical
individual rights ideology in mediating ethnic conflict and in overcoming a legacy of political repression and racial subordination.
This examination of some of the Court's opinions addresses questions of both adjudicative methodology and substantive law. I begin
by discussing two critical methodological tools the Court employs in
its adjudicative process. First, I describe how, in my view, the Court
has advanced comparative jurisprudence by consistently drawing
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1572-81 (1984); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1393-94 (1984). The counter-argument to the critical
rights theory's critique is set forth in Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical
Legal Studies and Reparations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 323-330 (1087); Patricia J.

Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987). For a helpful guide to critical race theory, see Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L.

REV. 461 (1993).
10. S. AFR. CONST. § 167(2).
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on international human rights law and principles and on foreign law
in its opinions. Second, I describe the way in which the Court has
centered its jurisprudence within a political context by embracing
the agenda defined by the Constitution itself. Finally, I argue that
these two methodological tools provide legitimacy for the Court as it
seeks to construct a jurisprudence that makes a clear break with
apartheid justice,11 reflects the distinct values of the new South
Africa," and is faithful to international human rights norms. 3
I. INTERNATIONALIZING CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

During the apartheid years, South Africa remained the focus of
significant developments in international law concerning the
compatibility of apartheid with international human rights norms,"'
the international status of the "homelands," s and the international
status of the liberation movement and its armed opposition to

11. The extensive literature on the apartheid legal system, which was designed to
enforce rigid racial segregation in all areas of life and to suppress Black political activity, is beyond the scope of this article. The key elements of apartheid justice are
discussed in DUGARD, supra note 5, at 53-104. Despite the legal death of apartheid, its
legacy continues to cast a long shadow over the South African legal system. See Daisy
M. Jenkins, From Apartheid to Majority Rule: A Glimpse into South Africa's Journey
Towards Democracy, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463, 479 (1996).

12. The founding provisions of the Constitution identify those values as, inter alia,
the promotion of 'human dignity," "equality," "non-racialism," and "non-sexism." S.
APR. CONST. §§ 1(a), 1(b).
13. Describing the Constitutional Court as "a central pillar in [the government's]
efforts to build [a] human rights culture," Minister of Justice Dullah Omar observed
that the Court's "function and purpose [is to] ensur[e] that never again will our citizens be deprived of their human rights ...... Minister of Justice Dullah Omar,
Address at the Inauguration Ceremony of the Constitutional Court (Feb. 14, 1995),
available at <http://sunsite.wits.ac.za/law/court/jdinaug.htnl>.
14. See J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 222-27
(1979); JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 156-58 (1987); Johan

van der Vyver, Statehood in InternationalLaw, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 9, 39-42 (1991).
15. In the early years of the apartheid era, the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950, together
with the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950, divided the South African population
according to race and assigned each group to a particular area. The Promotion of the
Bantu Self-Government Act 46 of 1959 created eight Black "nations"-there would ultimately be 10-that came to be known as "bantustans" or "homelands." "Bantu" was
the apartheid term for Black Africans. The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act 57 of
1970 required Black South Africans to become citizens of a particular homeland, regardless of whether they had lived there or not. Of the 10 homelands, South Africa
conferred nominal independence on 3 of them, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda
(the "TBVC" states), but they were never recognized as independent states by the international community. See John Dugard, South Africa's "Independent" Homelands: An
Exercise in Denationalization, 10 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 11, 19-33 (1980); Henry

Richardson, Self-Determination, InternationalLaw and the South African Bantustan Policy,
17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185, 214-17 (1978).
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apartheid." Indeed, world-wide condemnation of the apartheid state
increased general support for South Africa's international
accountability to human rights norms. The international community
codified its opposition to apartheid in numerous resolutions and
judicial rulings, thereby extending the reach and authority of human
rights standards beyond those applicable to South Africa. It is
therefore ironic that South Africa has moved from being a subject of
international human rights deliberations to being a leading exponent
of international public law in the world today.17 In this regard, South
Africa owes much of its transformation to the work of the
Constitutional Court.
The Constitution provides that, in interpreting its Bill of Rights
clauses, the Court "must" consider international law, and "may"
consider foreign case law.'8 The new Constitutional Court has
remained remarkably faithful to this injunction. In virtually every
case it has decided, and on a wide variety of issues, ranging from
jurisdictional matters to substantive law, it has referred both to
international and to foreign law. When considering such outside
sources, the Court has carefully explained that its decisions are
shaped by the South African legal experience and are dictated by a
commitment to the political transformation now taking place. 19

16. See, e.g., State v. Petane, 1988 (3) SA 51 (CC) (discussing the status of ANC
combatants under Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 1949); P.Q.R. BOBERG ET
AL., ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 66, 67-68 (1983) (noting distinction
between treatment of captured national liberation movement members as "traitors" by
South African law and as "prisoners of war" by international law).
17. In a recent work, John Dugard suggests that South Africa has always been attentive to international law principles in its domestic law, citing, in particular, the
courts of the pre-apartheid era. JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 45-47 (1994).
18. Section 39 of the Constitution provides that in interpreting the Bill of Rights,
courts "must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom," and "must consider international law" and
"may consider foreign law." S. AFR. CONST. § 39(1)(a)-(c). John Dugard suggests that
this section requires the Court to look not only to international treaties ratified by
South Africa and customary law accepted by South African courts, but, also to
"international law contained in general treaties, custom, general prinicples of law, the
writings of jurists, and the decisions of international and municipal courts." John Dugard, Public International Law, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 13-11
(Matthew Chaskalson et al., eds., 1996).
19. In its decision striking down the death penalty, for example, the Court observed
that "[c]omparative 'bill of rights' jurisprudence... [was] importan[t]... in the early
stages of the transition when there is no developed indigenous jurisprudence... on
which to draw" but that, in the final analysis, a judgment had to be made with "due
regard to [the South African] legal system, [its] history and circumstances, and the
structure and language of [its] Constitution." State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR
391, 414-15 (CC). Gunter Frankenberg applies critical theory to comparative
constitutionalism by noting that
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The jurists have utilized several approaches in deriving
guidance and support from these non-South African sources. In
Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995,2o Justice Sachs, in a concurring
opinion, authored a veritable primer on the treatment of group
rights in international law. In this case, the applicants challenged the
constitutionality of sections of the School Education Bill of Gauteng
Province 1 that prohibitedpublic schools from denying access based
on language proficiency. The Afrikaner community, seeking to
preserve publicly supported, all-Afrikaans schools, argued that the
challenged provisions denied them their group right to cultural
integrity. The Court upheld the challenged law, reasoning that the
relevant constitutional guarantees relied upon by the applicants'
imposed no affirmative state duty to establish exclusive schools for
linguistic groups, but merely prohibited the state from interfering
with private initiatives to set up such special language schools.

[ilnstead of pretending to the posture of a neutral, objective, and
disinterested observer, the comparatist has to regard herself as being
involved: involved in an ongoing, particular social practice constituted
and pervaded by law; involved in a given tradition (a peculiar story of
law); and involved in a specific mode of thinking and talking about
law.... It becomes clearer then than any vision of the foreign laws is
derived from and shaped by domestic assumptions and bias.
Gunter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons:Rethinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 411, 443 (1985).
20. 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC).
21. The bill was codified as the School Education Act 6 of 1995 (Gauteng). Gauteng
Sch, 1996 (3) SALR at 170.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 177.
24. The applicants argued that the challenged language in the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 violated the provisions of the interim Constitution that protected the
right to education on an equal basis. Id. at 172. However, the education provisions of
the final Constitution remove the ambiguity that led to the Gauteng Schol case, and
make clear that linguistic groups have a qualified right to state-supported singlelanguage schools. The Constitution provides that
[e]veryone has the right to receive education in the official language or
languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that
education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all
reasonable educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into account(a) equity,
(b) practicability, and
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory
laws and practices.
S. AFR. CONST. § 29(2).
25. Gauteng Sch., 1996 (3) SALR at 173.
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Justice Sachs analyzed the question in its broadest sense, i.e.,
whether genuine application of the protection guaranteed to
individuals against discrimination requires, in the South African
context, affirmative state measures to protect cultural minorities like
the Afrikaner community.26 This inquiry led him to canvass the
history of the group rights/individual rights split in the
international
• • 27 law context, commencing with League of Nations-era
principles. The "current trend" in international law, Justice Sachs
explained, does not oblige states to act affirmatively to protect
minority groups that have not been the victims of past
discrimination.
Accordingly, special measures need not be
undertaken to protect the group rights of the Afrikaner2'
Justice Sachs followed a similar approach in his concurring
opinion in Coetzee v. Government of the Republic of South Africa,' a case
challenging the constitutional validity of a law providing for
imprisonment of judgment debtors. Asserting the need to "locate
ourselves in the mainstream of international democratic practice," 3' the
Justice canvassed such international instruments as the American

26. Justice Sachs stated that "[tihe question... is whether there is a current trend
towards supplementing individual rights expressed mainly by the principles of nondiscrimination and equality, with additional group rights claimable against the State in
the form of obligatory state support for fostering cultural linguistic and religious diversity." Id. at 206.
27. Id. at 190.
28. Id. at 194.
29. Id. Justice Sachs was careful to explain his point:

the central theme that runs through the development of international
human rights law in relation to protection of minorities is that of
preventing discrimination against disadvantaged and marginalised
groups, guaranteeing them full and factual equality and providing for
remedial action to deal with past discrimination.... There is nothing to
indicate in the present case that the petition based itself on arguments
that the clause in dispute imposed discrimination, denied equality[,] or
repudiated remedial action for a marginalised or deprived language
minority. On the contrary, the contention was that existing rights to
language exclusivity in relatively affluent schools were well endowed
because of past State support, while the majority of schoolchildren in the
province were, as result of past State discrimination, forced to attend
schools that were grossly deprived in comparison. Thus the thrust of
international human rights law principles would be far more in favour
of supporting the so-called "sociological" or "functional" minority, than
of upholding the claims of what might be termed the "sociological" or
"functional" majority.
Id.
30.
31.

1995 (4) SALR 631, 651-74 (CC).
Id. at 659.
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Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,32 the American
Convention on Human Rights,. and the UN International Covenant on
He concluded that "international
Civil and Political Rights.
instruments strongly repudiate the core element of the institution of
civil imprisonment, namely the locking-up of people merely
because they fail to pay contractual debts, but that there is a
penumbra relating to money payments in which imprisonment
can be used in appropriately defined crcumstances. ' o
In a case challenging the amnesty provisions of the Truth and
Reconciliation Act,3 Azanian Peoples Organization(AZAPO) v. President
of the Republic of South Africa,37 the Constitutional Court approached
international principles from two directions by simultaneously
rejecting the applicability of international law while embracing
general international principles of justice. The applicants argued that
the Protocols to the Geneva Convention prohibited a signatory state
from granting amnesty to state actors guilty of torture and other
human rights violations.# In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Mohamed rejected this argument, reasoning that the instruments
relied upon by the applicants were not applicable to South Africa
since the country was not a signatory of the Convention or its later
protocols3 Further, even if the instruments were applicable,
international law did not bar amnesty programs
40 such as the one
provided for in the Truth and Reconciliation Act.
Justice Mohamed's discussion of the applicability of the
Geneva Convention seems somewhat anomalous. On one hand, he
appears to undermine the ability of private litigants to rely on
international law to test the constitutionality of domestic law while
at the same time recognizing the instructive value that international
legal consensus and experience play in the Court's decision-making
process. In first determining whether the challenged domestic law
violated the Constitution, Justice Mohamed ruled that if there were
no constitutional violation-as he found in this challenge to the
32. American Declaration of the Rights & Duties of Man, O.A.S. Off. Rec.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (May 2, 1948).
33. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Off. Rec., OEA/Ser.K/XVI/I.1,
doc. 65 rev. 1 corr.2 (Jan. 7, 1970).
34. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Mar. 23,
1976).
35. Id. at 661.
36. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 establishes
a procedure for granting amnesty to individuals guilty of apartheid-era political offenses as long as they provide full disclosure of their human rights violations.
37. 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC).
38. Id. at 687-91.
39. Id. at 689 n.29.
40. Id. at 689-90.
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Truth and Reconciliation Act-there could be no resort to
international law by a private litigant except as such law might
provide guidance to the Court.4 ' He then reviewed the Geneva
Conventions and their relevant protocols as relied upon by the
applicants and found them inapposite for the reason, among others,
that at the time of the offenses South Africa was not a party to
these instruments through which amnesty could be granted.42
Unfortunately, however, Justice Mohamed's approach appears to
misapprehend the thrust of the constitutional embrace of
international human rights law by unduly limiting the application of
international law only to those treaties actually ratified by the
apartheid state. In the end, the Justice concluded that even if the
Geneva Conventions and their protocols applied to South Africa do
not prohibit states from granting amnesty, but rather could be read
as endorsing such measures.
In addition to international legal instruments, Justice Mohamed
also considered the international experience of other states emerging
from repressive regimes. Using Chile, Argentina and El Salvador as
examples, Justice Mohamed found support for amnesty as a fair, just
and internationally acceptable solution for adjudicating the gross
human rights violations of repressive states.44 In acknowledging the
similarities between the democratic restructuring in these Latin
American states and the task facing South Africa, the Court placed
the South African commitment to the truth commission model of
amnesty, coupled with truth-telling, within the context of the
international community's growing acceptance of these quasi45
judicial agencies.

41. Id. at 688.
42. Id. at 689 n.29.
43. For this proposition, Justice Mohamed cited Article 6(5) of Protocol II to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, which provides that "[a]t the end of hostilities, the
authorities in power shall endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons
who participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons
related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained." AZAPO, 1996
(4) SALR at 689-90.
44. Id. at 686.
45. According to Justice Mohamed,
[wihat emerges from the experience of these and other countries that
have ended periods of authoritarian and abusive rule, is that there is no
single or uniform international practice in relation to amnesty. Decisions
of states in transition, taken with a view to assisting such transition, are
quite different from acts of a state covering up its own crimes by
granting itself immunity. In the former case, it is not a question of the
government agents responsible for the violations indemnifying
themselves, but rather, one of a constitutional compact being entered
into by all sides, with former victims being well-represented, as part of
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It appears that the Constitutional Court is equally prepared to
adopt the lessons drawn both from international jurisprudence and
from foreign jurisdictions, notwithstanding that the Constitution
mandates consideration of the former while merely permitting con46
sideration of the latter. In several cases interpreting the South
African Bill of Rights, the Court has most frequently discussed the
constitutional law of the United States, 7 India, 8 neighboring southern African countries,49 Canada, and the United Kingdom.51
One prominent case, Du Plessis v. De Klerk,5 2 raised the issue of
whether one private party could enforce the free speech guarantees

an ongoing process to develop constitutional democracy and prevent a
repetition of the abuses.
Id. at 671, 687.
46. S. AFR. CONST. § 39(1)(aHc). Indeed, in its consideration of foreign law the
Court continues the comparativist approach that characterized the constitutional
drafting process. See, e.g., ZIYAD MOTALA, CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1994); THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA (Kenneth W. Thompson ed.,

1990).
47. See, e.g., Fose v. Minister of Safety and Sec., 1997 (3) SALR 786, 801-07 (CC)
(discussing the right to damage awards for civil rights violations under § 42 U.S.C.
1983); Fraser v. Children's Court, 1997 (2) SALR 261, 276 (CC) (reviewing Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and other case law on the rights of unwed fathers); Du
Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SALR 850, 871-72 (CC) (discussing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) with regard to the
applicability of the Bill of Rights to private conduct); State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3)
SALR 391, 415-23 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence);
State v. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR 632, 641, 643, 646-47 (CC) (discussing cases that apply the United States' Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment).
48. See, e.g., Brink v. Kitshoff, 1996 (4) SALR 197, 215-16 (CC) (discussing case law
interpreting equality provisions of the Indian Constitution); Makwanyane, 1995 (3)
SALR 391, 426-29 (distinguishing the Indian Supreme Court's ruling in Bachan Singh
v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 S.C.C. 684, which declared the Indian death penalty constitutional).
49. See, e.g., Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 413 (noting the abolition of the death
penalty in Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola); Williams, 1995 (3) SALR at 642-43
(citing with favor decisions of Namibia and Zimbabwe prohibiting corporal punishment).
50. See, e.g., Fose, 1997 (3) SALR at 807-09 (discussing the right to constitutional
and punitive damages under the Canadian Charter); Fraser, 1997 (2) SALR at 276-82
(reviewing case law on rights of unwed fathers); State v. Coetzee, 1997 3 SALR 527,
545 (CC) (distinguishing Canadian decisions on the burden of proof in criminal cases);
Gauteng Sch. Educ. Bill of 1995, 1996 (3) SALR 165, 206 (CC) (discussing Canadian
Charter provisions requiring state-supported education for the French minority in
Canada).
51. See, e.g., State v. Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR 642, 646, 656 (CC) (discussing English
legal principles that place the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession on
the prosecution).
52. 1996 (3) SALR 850 (CC).

Michigan Journalof Race & Law

[VOL 3:29

of the Constitution against another private party.*3 The question
concerned the applicability of the Bill of Rights to private conduct
or, as the South Africans put the issue, whether constitutional rights
apply horizontally as well as vertically- 4
In Du Plessis, individuals sued the Pretoria News and its
publisher, editor, and a reporter for defamation in connection with a
series of articles charging certain private citizens with financing the
UNITA forces in the Angolan civil war. s The appellants-defendants
asserted as a defense that their actions in publishing the allegedly
defamatory material were protected by the free speech provision of
the Bill of Rights. 4 However, the Court declined to apply the
protections of the Bill of Rights to wholly private conduct.7 Once
again, the Court based its reasoning in large measure on what it
considered to be the prevailing weight of authority in foreign
jurisdictions, specifically the constitutional law of the United
States,s' Canada, 4 Germany,6 and Ireland.6'

53. Id.
54. In South African jurisprudence, the term "horizontality" refers to the application of
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to private disputes, in contrast to "vertical"
application, which protects individuals from state violation of these guarantees. See
Du Plessis, 1996 (3) SALR at 860-61; Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996 (4) SALR 744, 791-92 (CC). The question of horizontality was the
subject of much discussion during the drafting period. See, e.g., Gilbert Marcus,
Freedom of Expression Under the Constitution, 10 S. AFR. J.ON HUM. RTS. 140, 143 & n.16
(1994); H. A. Strydom, The Private Domainand the Bill of Rights, 10 SAPR/PL 52 (1995);
Johan van der Vyver, The Private Sphere in Constitutional Litigation, 57 THRHR 378
(1996). As it stands, the Constitution calls for the horizontal application of some rights,
such as the right to equality, but not others: "[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a
natural or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taling into account
the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right." S.AFR.
CONST. § 8(2).
55. Du Plessis, 1996 (3) SALR at 858.
56. Du Plessis, 1996 (3) SALR at 858-59.
57. Id. at 859. The 1996 Constitution ultimately superseded this decision. See S.AFR.
CONST. § 8(2).
58. The Du Plessis Court discussed the state action requirement in connection with
the United States Supreme Court opinions applying Bill of Rights protections to
seemingly private conduct in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Du Plessis, 1996 (3) SALR at 871-72.
59. Id. at 872. In holding that the South African Bill of Rights did not apply to conduct between private parties, the Court found the Canadian case of Retail, Wholesale &
Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1987] 33 D.L.R.4th 174, to
be analogous. Du Plessis, 1996 (3) SALR at 872.
60. Id. at 874-75 (discussing the German rule of law applying constitutional rights
directly in matters involving state action and indirectly in private law disputes).
61. Id. at 872 (citing the Irish case of C.M v. T.M., [1991] I.L.R.M. 268, which held
that the common law rule that a wife's domicile is determined by that of her husband
violated the equality provisions of the Constitution, for the proposition that, in Ireland, constitutional rights apply horizontally in some circumstances).
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In Fose v. Minister of Safety and Security,6 a review of foreign
precedent helped the Court define the proper remedies for constitutional violations.6 At issue was the proper measure of damages in
an action involving a tortious assault by police officers." The Court
considered whether, in a situation involving a constitutional tort, the
victim should be permitted to recover for the constitutional violation
over and above the amount he would recover in common law tort.6
In the instant case, the victim sought both punitive damages and
exemplary damages for the constitutional breach. 66
As the Court had never before addressed this issue, most of its
opinion comprised a summary of discussions from other jurisdictions,
including the United States, 67 Canada, 8 the United Kingdom, 69
Trinidad and Tobago," and New Zealand.2 The Court explained
that although foreign law was a helpful guide, the resulting decision
was shaped by features unique to the South African legal systemnamely, the lack of strict sovereign immunity, the unitary court
system, and the interaction of the common law with constitutional
law. n Moreover, the Court observed that as a matter of public policy,
punitive damages would exert a strain on the public purse that the
country, given its other obligations, could ill afford:
[i]n a country where there is a great demand generally on
scarce resources, where the government has various
constitutionally prescribed commitments which have
substantial economic implications ... it seems to me to be
62. 1997 (3) SALR 786 (CC).
63. Id. at 801-16 (examining the laws of the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago, New Zealand, Ireland, India, Sri Lanka, and Germany regarding damage awards).
64. Id. at 795.
65. Id. at 796.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 803 (citing with approval Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (punitive
damages available against state actors in their individual capacities), Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (punitive damages not available against municipalities), and Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (propriety of awarding damages for a
constitutional breach)).
68. Id. at 808 (observing that punitive damages are available for violations of
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but infrequently employed).
69. Id. at 810 (discussing the English case of Rookes v. Barnard, [19641 App. Cas.
1129 (H.L.), which contains an argument of Lord Devlin in favor of placing limits on
punitive damages).
70. Id. at 811-12 (citing Maharajv. Attorney-Gen. Trin & Tobago (No. 2), [1979] AC
385 (PC), which held that a judge is not personally liable for unlawfully detaining a
lawyer for contempt).
71. Id. at 812-13 (citing Simpson v. Attorney-Gen. (Baigent's case), [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R.
667 (C.A.)).
72. Id. at 819.
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inappropriate to use these scarce resources to pay punitive
constitutional damages to plaintiffs who are already fully
compensated for the injuries done to them with no real
assurance that such payment will have any deterrent or
preventative effect. It would seem that funds of this nature
could be better employed in structural and systemic ways
to eliminate or substantially reduce the causes of
infringement.7
Accordingly, the Court deemed neither constitutional nor punitive damages appropriate where common law damages would
adequately compensate the victim.74
The Court has moved quickly to develop a "comparative bill of
rights jurisprudence, m' particularly in its adjudication of criminal
cases. In State v. Makwanyane, a case ultimately declaring that the
imposition of the death penalty violated the Bill of Rights, the Court
weighed several factors relating to non-South African law. It
considered relevant, but not dispositive, the fact that public
international law does not prohibit capital punishment.76 In reaching
its conclusion, the Court examined rulings of the Human Rights
Committee of the United Nations? and the European Court of
Human Rights. n It reviewed at length the United States' convoluted
adjudication of the issue, finding merit in the Furman v. Georgia7
decision discussing the inherently arbitrary nature of the sanction.' °
In the end, the Constitutional Court rejected the U.S. Supreme
Court's ultimate conclusion that the penalty could be constitutional

73. Id. at 827-28.
74. Id. at 828.
75. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 414-15 (CC). According to the Court,
[c]omparative "bill of rights" jurisprudence will no doubt be of importance, particularly in the early stages of the transition where there is no
developed indigenous jurisprudence in this branch of the law on which
to draw. Although we are told by Section 35(1) that we "may" have regard to foreign case law, it is important to appreciate that this will not
necessarily offer a safe guide to the interpretation of Chapter Three of
our Constitution.
Id. (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 415.
77. Id. at 424-25.
78. Id. at 425-26.
79. 408 U.S. 238, 245 (1972). In that case, Justice Douglas wrote that "it is 'cruel and
unusual' to apply the death penalty... selectively to minorities whose numbers are
few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing
to see suffer though it would not countenance general application of the same penalty
across the board." Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
80. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at:420-21.
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in certain circumstances." Instead, it adopted the reasoning of the
U.S. Supreme Court's death penalty opponents" and of the courts of
Massachusetts and California, which ruled that the penalty violated
their respective state constitutions. 3 In reaching its decision, the
Constitutional Court compared its Bill of Rights protections with
those of the United States, as well as with the constitutions of India,
Germany, Hungary, Canada, and Tanzania." Consequently, the
South African Court cast a critical eye to a vast array of judicial
views on the propriety of capital punishment, ultimately applying
the perspectives of those courts it believed demonstrated the
soundest reasoning.
Two other criminal cases in which the Court relied heavily on
foreign and international law bear mentioning. In State v. Williams,"
petitioners challenged the practice of caning juvenile offenders,
findingl support for their position in the 1994 interim Bill of
Rights. Here, too, the Court found persuasive Justice Brennan's
views, expressed in Furman v. Georgia, regarding the constitutional
obligation to protect human dignity.87 In surveying those states
which have abandoned juvenile whipping, the Court perceived "a
81. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that capital punishment is not
per se unconstitutional, but that statutes must specify the aggravating and mitigating
factors that would form the basis of such a sentence).
82. For example, the South African Constitutional Court cited with favor Justice
Brennan's dissent in Gregg:
[tihe fatal constitutional infirmity in the punishment of death is that it
treats members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed
with and discarded. (It is) thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the [Cruel and Unusual Punishment] Clause that even the vilest
criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 422-23 & n.88 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 238 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
83. In California and Massachusetts, the penalty was found to be unconstitutionally
cruel. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972); District Att'y for Suffolk Dist. v.
Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980). California subsequently amended the constitution to reinstate the death penalty. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27.
84. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR at 426-30, 436-38, 440-41.
85. 1995 (3) SALR 632 (CC).
86. Id. at 638-49. The Court considered whether the practice of corporal
punishment as applied to juveniles violated section 10 of the interim Bill of Rights,
which guaranteed to every person "the right to respect for and protection of his or her
dignity," and section 11(2), which provided that "[n]o person shall be subject to torture
of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any person be subject to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." S. AFR. CONST. of 1994 §§ 10,
11(2). Similar language is found in the 1996 Constitution, which protects the right of
persons to "have their dignity respected and protected," "not to be tortured in any
way," and "not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way." S.

AFR. CONST. §§ 10, 12(1)(dHe).
87. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR at 641.
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growing consensus in the international community" that the practice
offended societal notions of decency and violated human dignity. 88
In another criminal case, State v. Coetzee,8 9 the Court declared
unconstitutional a provision of the Criminal Procedure Act
requiring a defendant charged with making a false representation to
prove that he made the representation without knowledge of its
falsity.90 The Court noted early in its opinion that the government
had failed to demonstrate that other countries employed a similar
burden-shifting scheme.9 ' It also discussed at length Canadian
decisions that were based on the Presumption of Innocence Clause
in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 92 The Court
observed that under Canadian case law, the constitutionality of
statutory schemes shifting burdens of proof to the criminal
defendant depended, in part, upon whether the offense was
regulatory or "truly criminal" in nature.93 However, the Court
rejected this approach, ruling instead that distinctions based upon
the nature of the offense could not be justified under94 the South
African Constitution's Presumption of Innocence Clause.
By demonstrating such discriminating reliance on foreign and
international law, the Constitutional Court is at once embracing the
country's grand project of political transformation and claiming its
place among the world's constitutional democracies. In locating
authority for its actions in the legal expression of the international
community, the Court is establishing the legitimacy of its own
actions while strengthening the international norms upon which it
relies. The Court's work continues to define constitutional adjudication as an interactive international conversation, and its progressive
approach to universal human rights problems potentially may realign comparative constitutionalism, to the particular benefit of other

88. Id. at 644 (emphasis in original).
89. 1997 (3) SALR 527 (CC).
90. Id. Similarly, in State v. Zuma, 1995 (2) SALR 642 (CC), the Court struck down a
provision of the criminal code permitting the admission of confessions made before a
magistrate without proof that they were freely and voluntarily made. The Court held
that the provision unconstitutionally shifted to the defendant the burden to prove that
the confession was not free and voluntary, and thereby violated certain guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. Id. at 662.
91. State v. Coetzee, 1997 (3) SALR at 537.
92. Id. at 542-46.
93. Id. at 545-46.
94. Id. at 546-47. Justice Langa wrote that "[tihe presumption of innocence is
breached whenever the effect of a reverse onus provision is such that the accused
could be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt or innocence.... It is the substance of the [criminal] provision, not its form, that is
decisive." Id.
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African states that have recently rejected the Westminster model in
favor of constitutional systems.
Spirited debate and dialogue are the hallmarks of these opinions, both within the Court and between the Court and its
international counterparts. Unlike the United States Supreme Court,
the South African high court is willing to apply the legal theories of
any other state that has grappled with the same issues. In so doing,
it creates a global jurisprudence in which its own voice promises to
be unique, refreshing, and compelling.
II. POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
The Constitutional Court has drawn generously from foreign
experience, and in particular from U.S. law, but it would be a
mistake for American observers to read the South African
constitutional rights project merely as a flattering imitation of
American constitutionalism.95 The South African Constitution,
unlike our own, reflects a value system that comprehends and seeks
to redress racial and class oppression. 96 While it is true that the
document represents political compromise, it is not simply a rewrite
of the Freedom Charter.97 In its essence, it embraces a progressive
95. One commentator wrote that "in some loosely metaphorical ways, South
Africa is both a mirror for and the child of the American legal system." Carol Steiker,
Pretoria not Peoria: S v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1285, 1285 (1996). There is a rich literature comparing individual rights in the
American and South African legal systems prior to the adoption of the present
Constitution. See, e.g., John Dugard, Toward Racial Justice in South Africa, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION ABROAD 349 (Louis Henlin & Albert Rosenthal eds., 1990) (suggesting

South Africa would have coped better with racial tensions had it adopted a
Constitution similar to the U.S. Constitution); Higginbotham, Racism, supra note 5, at
484-85 (comparing racism in the courts of South Africa and the United States and
concluding that constitutional protections are of limited effectiveness as a remedy).
96. As Justice Holmes stated, the U.S. "[Clonstitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the State or of laissez faire." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
97. The Freedom Charter sets forth the fundamental human rights principles
embraced by the African National Congress (ANC).

See AFRICAN NATIONAL

CONGRESS, FREEDOM CHARTER, reprinted in 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249-51
(1989). The Charter was adopted in 1955 at a conference of the ANC at Kliptown. The
Charter was the result of a process in which the Congress canvassed the population
for a year, seeking to identify the grievances and aspirations of the oppressed
communities. At the Kliptown conference, 2884 delegates considered the draft Charter
and ultimately adopted it. See RAYMOND SUTINER & JEREMY CRONIN, THIRTY YEARS OF
THE FREEDOM CHARTER 12-104 (1986). Later, in its Constitutional Guidelines for a
Democratic South Africa, the ANC sought to constitutionalize the principles of the
Freedom Charter. See AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES
FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA, reprinted in 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235-39
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ideology and vision for South Africa. Like the United States' Bill of
Rights, the South African Bill of Rights guarantees classical
fundamental human rights. 98 Unlike the American experience,
however, those rights came to be identified and codified, ab initio, in
a goal-oriented process which prioritized the elimination of racism,
sexism, and economic exploitation. It was a process that not only
resulted in the written words of the Bill of Rights, but also
informed and anchored the work of its interpreters, the
Constitutional Court.9 In this sense, the South African
constitutional project is strikingly different from its American
counterpart, where rights that were shaped by an oppressor class

(1989). The guidelines called for a Constitution that would create a non-racial
democracy, terminate apartheid and outlaw racism, encourage redistribution of
wealth, promote sexual equality, protect cultural, linguistic and religious rights, and
employ affirmative action to correct past discrimination. Id. For a discussion of the
guidelines, see Albie Sachs, Post-Apartheid South Africa: A ConstitutionalFramework, 6
WORLD POL'Y J. 589 (1989).
98. The ANC was not always a firm advocate of inclusion of a justiciable bill of
rights in the new Constitution. Skepticism within the Congress reflected the view that
a bill of rights might serve to entrench White authority and deprive the democratically
elected bodies of the power they needed to effectuate change. See Charles VillaVicencio, Whither South Africa?: Colonialism and Law-Making, 40 EMORY L.J. 141, 148
(1991).
In a paper presented to the ANC in 1986, Albie Sachs discussed the limitations
of a bill of rights, noting that the claim for such protections came from people who
had not been active against apartheid. See Albie Sachs, A Bill of Rightsfor South Africa:
Areas of Agreement and Disagreement, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 13 (1989). Sachs
argued that the judiciary could not be trusted to implement a bill of rights in a manner
that would enhance rights for the oppressed communities. Id. at 15. Thereafter, the
ANC changed its views somewhat, concluding that widespread participation in the
drafting of a bill of rights might reinforce, rather than undermine, democratic values.
Id. at 16-17.
Ultimately, in 1991, the ANC put forward a draft of a fairly comprehensive bill
of rights that included civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural
rights. A Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Africa-Working Draft for Consultation,
reprintedin 18 SOC. JUST. 49 (1991). Then, in 1992, the ANC published a revised text of
its Draft Bill of Rights. ANC Draft Bill of Rights: A PreliminaryRevised Text (May 1992),
reprinted in ALBIE SACHS, ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 215-35

(1992). For a discussion of the early debate leading to adoption of the Bill of Rights, see
Nicholas Haysom, Democracy, Constitutionalism,and the ANC's Bill of Rights for a New
South Africa, 18 Soc. JUST. 40 (1991); Penuell M. Maduna, Judicial Review and Protection
of Human Rights under a New ConstitutionalOrderin South Africa, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 73 (1989); Nathaniel M. Masemola, Rights and a Future South African
Constitution: The Controversialand the Non-Controversial,21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
45 (1989); Johan van der Vyver, ConstitutionalOptions for Post-ApartheidSouth Africa,
40 EMORY L.J. 745 (1991).

99. For example, in considering what constitutional language could best guarantee
meaningful gender equality, Albie Sachs observed that "the Constitution should permit and require the law to look at the actual lives that women lead and thereby enable
women to define for themselves what their expectations and priorities are." ALBIE
SACHS, PROTECTING RIGHTS IN A NEW SOUTH AFRICA 57 (1990).
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have been dispensed in -small pieces and from the top to the
bottom. 1°° The South African jurists are not crippled by the
interpretive problems that plague constitutional jurists such as those
comprising the United States Supreme Court, whose touchstone is a
document born of an era in which racism was the prevailing
ideology."'
Nevertheless, the problem remains that constitutional rights are
by nature indeterminate and contingent. Theoretically they exist off
in a stratosphere hovering somewhere above realpolitique. Rights are
colorless, genderless, and classless, and therefore a system which
privileges individual rights can invite resort to them for purposes
antithetical to progressive social change. Rights ideals are not
synonymous with progressive ideals.
The American experience

100. As Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out in a bicentennial address in 1987, the
government created by the Constitution "was defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain the
system of constitutional governmental, and its respect for individual freedoms and
human rights, we hold fundamental today." Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the
Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, in 13 SIGNS 2, 2 (1987). For the rich literature on
the racism and sexism imbedded in the U.S. Constitution and the efforts to rise above
that history, see generally Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Constitutional Convention:
Making a Covenant with Death, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION 188-225 (Richard Beeman
et al. eds., 1987); STAUGHTON LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 153-84 (1967); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977); Ellen C. DuBois, Out-

growing the Compact of the Fathers:Equal Rights, Women's Suffrage, and the United States
Constitution, 1820-1878, 74J. AM. HIST. 836 (1987).

In the final analysis, constitutions codify existing political relationships. One
commentator stated it this way:
[allthough constitutional arrangements vary, they may be generally
characterized as instruments that establish rules for making rules. Legalism is, accordingly, a function of a larger phenomenon which
ultimately determines the content and construction of laws and other legal instruments. Although the legitimacy of a government may be said to
reside in the rule of law, in reality, the political distribution of power
determines how a society is governed.
Melanie Beth Oliviero, Human Needs and Human Rights: Which are More Fundamental?,
40 EMORY L.J. 911, 914-15 (1991).

101. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, An Allegorical Critique of the United States Civil Rights
Model, in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF LAW 3, 8-12 (Bob Hepple & Erika M.

Szyszczak eds., 1992) (discussing the ambivalence of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding racism as a consequence, inter alia, of the Framers' racism); Jonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The End of History and the New World Order: The Triumph of Capitalism and the Competition Between Liberalism and Democracy, 25 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 277, 290 (1992) (distinguishing between inclusionary democracies, such as
South Africa, and exclusionary ones, such as the United States).
102. Indeed, some commentators have argued that an individual democratic rights
regime is fully consistent with racial subordination. Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Seventh Chronicle: Race, Democracy and the State, 42 UCLA L. REV 721, 729 (1994).
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illustrates that when rights are not anchored to a progressive
political process, they can become counter-rights that have nothing
to do with building community and redressing inequity and have
everything to do with maintaining the status quo." Consider, for
example, the "inequality" arguments raised by the White male
"victim" of affirmative action.
In a system that distinguishes constitutional rights from policy
and that places its highest value on the abstract right in contrast to
policy, how can rights be transformative engines of social change?
And equally troublesome is, should they be?1 05 Is an individual
rights system always ideologically problematic? Put another way, is
there any way of insulating rights from ideological capture in a fluid
political system? Is it appropriate for rights interpreters to construct
a framework of legal analysis that renders
them highly visible pro10 6
ponents of progressive social change?
The South African Constitutional Court continues to seek
answers to these issues by contextualizing its rights jurisprudence.
In its opinions, the Court employs a new juridical language that
103. Derrick Bell's fictional heroine, Geneva Crenshaw, stated it this way:
we have attained all the rights we sought in law and gained none of the
resources we need in life. Like the crusaders of old, we sought the holy
grail of "equal opportunity" and, having gained it in court decisions and
civil rights statues, find it transformed ... into one more device the society can use to perpetuate the racial status quo.
Derrick Bell, The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice: The Chronicle of the Constitutional
Contradiction,in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 9, 9 (Janet Dewart ed., 1991).
104. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1978)
(challenging the University of California at Davis Medical School admissions program
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause). For discussion of the inadequacy of the
U.S. Constitution's equality provisions to redress the suppression and discrimination
experienced by racial minorities and women, see Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 84 (Marshall Cohen et al.
eds., 1977). There is a considerable literature arguing that the history of the equality
provisions supports a more generous interpretation of their reach than the Supreme
Court has ever been willing to give. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the
Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 HARV. C. R.-C.L L. REV. 299 (1993); Robin West, Toward
an Abolitionist Interpretationof the FourteenthAmendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 111 (1991).
105. The legal realist denies that law either can be or should be socially transforming:
[als lawyers we will do well to be on our guard against any suggestion
that, through law, our society can be reformed, purified, or saved. The
function of law ... is altogether more modest and less apocalyptic. It is
to provide a mechanism for the settlement of disputes in the light of
broadly conceived principles on whose soundness, it must be assumed,
there is general consensus among us.
GRANT GILMORE, THE ACES OF AMERICAN LAW 109 (1977).
106. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 286 (1977).
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consistently and repeatedly identifies the values underlying its
choices, which it unmasks as just that-moral choices rather than
scientific results.1" Yet the Court perceives that its moral authority as
the ultimate interpreter of rights is wholly dependent upon its
ability to be faithful to the constitutional vision. Thus, even as the
jurists take great care to describe at length their value choices, they
return time and again to the political imperatives that gave rise to
and are the life-blood of the Constitution. In situating rights claims
within a defined political project, the Court is better able to identify
and reconcile the tensions existing between freedom and alienation,
autonomy and community, and group rights and individual rights.
Abstract theoretical rights are tested against their practical effects
and, ultimately, against the constitutional vision of a new
dispensation reflected in the actual text.' This, the Court appears to
say, is the ultimate raisond'etre of a rights jurisprudence.
I have identified four areas which, I suggest, taken together,
begin to define the way in which the Court contextualized its
constitutional adjudication. First, the Court has sought to describe
its own role and processes as the interpreter of rights in the
country's new constitutional system. In other words, it has defined
the nature of transparency"° for the judicial branch. Second, the

107. As Justice Sachs stated,

[the Court] should not engage in purely formal or academic analysis, nor
simply restrict ourselves to ad hoc technicism, but rather focus on what
has been called the synergetic relation between the values underlying the
guarantees of fundamental rights and the circumstances of the particular
case.... In the end, we will frequently be unable to escape making difficult value judgments, where... logic and precedent are of limited
assistance.
Coetzee v. Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1995 (4) SALR 631, 656-57 (CC).
For a discussion of values and choice in constitutional adjudication in South Africa,
see Bernard E. Harcourt, Mature Adjudication: Interpretive Choice in Recent Death Penalty Cases, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 255 (1996).
108. See Gauteng Sch. Educ. Bill of 1995, 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC). Justice Sachs
wrote that
[olne may accept that even abstract questions of law have to be considered in the concrete context of history, and we cannot ignore the fact,
urged upon us by counsel, that, although the words of the Constitutional
text are generalised, they are also suffused with specific and (frequently
contradictory) life experiences. Yet, even if the poignancy of history
flows through the veins of the Constitution, we must always be guided
by the words and spirit of the constitutional text itself, supporting, not
this group or that, but the values articulated by the Constitution.
Id. at 188.
109. "Transparency" in the South African political discourse concerns itself with the
accessibility and visibility of political processes. See Harcourt, supra note 107, at 263
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Court has acknowledged the transitional nature of this particular
political and constitutional moment. It has described the travesties
of the past and the vision for the future. Third, the Court has
identified those values which it believes are at the core of the
democratic enterprise in South Africa. Fourth, and finally, the Court
has sought to articulate the relationship between civil and political
rights on the one hand, and economic, social, and cultural rights on
the other. It has, in other words, attempted to unmask the material
consequences of the law's choices about rights.
A. The Court Defines its Role
Staking out a role for itself as teacher in the national discourse
on the relative rights and responsibilities of the individual and the
state, ° the Court has repeatedly identified its task as that of
"promot[ing] and develop[ing] ... a new culture" of respect for
human rights."' Perhaps its ruling abolishing capital punishment112
best exemplifies the method of self-examination through which the
Court has undertaken to inculcate a new value system. There the
Court refused to ignore a reality that has haunted abolitionistminded jurists and lawyers-that in an age of increased crime,
public opinion has increasingly favored the death penalty.13 Even if
(describing the court's decision in State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC), which
outlawed capital punishment, as providing a "vision of transparent adjudication that
articulates the values that underlie.., interpretive choice, making them available for
criticism ....).
110. As Alexander Bickel stated regarding the U.S. Supreme Court, "[the discussion
of problems and the declaration of broad principles by the Court is a vital element in
the community experience through which American policy is made. The Supreme
Court is, amongst other things, an educational body and the justices are inevitably
teachers in a vital national seminar." ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1970).
111. State v. Williams, 1995 (3) SALR 632 (CC). The Court noted that
[clourts do have a role to play in the promotion and development of a
new culture "founded on the recognition of human rights", in particular
with regard to those rights which are enshrined in the Constitution. It is a
role which demands that a court should be particularly sensitive to the
impact which the exercise of judicial functions may have on the rights of
individuals who appear before them; vigilance is an integral component
of this role, for it is incumbent on structures set up to administer justice
to ensure that, as far as possible, these rights, particularly of the weakest
and the most vulnerable, are defended and not ignored.
Id. at 635.
112. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
113. Id. at 431-32. In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Brennan explained that although
opinion polls reflected majority support for the death penalty, the fact that the penalty
was rarely inflicted suggested that society considered it an "unusual" punishment, and
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true, that fact was mere politics. Instead, constitutional values, as
identified by the Court, were all that mattered in assessing the
propriety of the ultimate penalty. According to Chief Justice
Chaskalson,
[plublic opinion may have some relevance to the enquiry,
but, in itself, it is no substitute for the duty vested in the
Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its
provisions without fear or favour.... The very reason for
establishing the new legal order, and for vesting the power
of judicial review of all legislation in the courts, was to
protect the rights of minorities and others who cannot
protect their rights adequately through the democratic
process.... It is only if there is a willingness to protect the
worst and the weakest amongst us that all
of us can be
114
secure that our own rights will be protected.
B. The Court and the Bridge to the New World
Political transitions are both challenging and perilous, for
although the old world has been rejected, it nevertheless retains its
power to influence the creation of the new world not yet realized. In
studying transitions from autocratic regimes to constitutional
democracies, scholars have begun to identify some of the factors that
distinguish the successes from the failures."" Certainly one critical
ingredient is whether the judiciary is an active, co-equal partner
with other state structures in advancing human rights and
democratic ideals. 16 The Constitutional Court has taken a number of

was, therefore, a more meaningful barometer of true public sentiment for purposes of
the Eighth Amendment. 408 U.S. 238, 299 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
114. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 431 (CC).
115. See, e.g., THEODORE SISK, DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE ELUSIVE
SOCIAL CONTRACT (1995) (discussing the transformation of South Africa from a divided society to an inclusive democracy); SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
TRANSFORMATION (Stephen John Stedman ed., 1994) (examining political, economic,
and social transition and reformation in South Africa); Samuel Decalo, The Process,
Prospects,and Constraintsof Democratizationin Africa, 91 AFR. AFF. 7 (1991) (identifying
common patterns and likely future developments in African democratization).
116. For a discussion of the importance of a strong judiciary in the new South Africa,
see Lynn Berat, Courting Justice: A Callfor Judicial Activism in a Transformed South Africa, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 849 (1993); Maduna, supra note 98, at 78; Ziyad Motala,
Independence of the Judiciary, Prospects and Limitations of Judicial Review in Terms of the
United States Model in a South African Order: Towards an Alternative Judicial Structure,
55 ALBANY L. REV. 367 (1991). On the nature of the judicial restructuring required by
democratic transformation, see Heinz Klug, The South African Judicial Order and the
Future: A Comparative Analysis of the South African Judicial System and Judicial Transi-
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opportunities to articulate its understanding of the demands of the
transitional period, and to coax and cajole the citizenry to appreciate
both the horrors of the past and the challenges of the future. The
epilogue'17 to the interim Constitution stated that
[t]his Constitution provides a historic bridge between the
past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife,
conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy
and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities
for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class,
belief or sex."'
In Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the
Republic of South Africa,"9 a case challenging the constitutionality of
the amnesty provisions of the Truth and Reconciliation Act, the
Court addressed itself to the need for creative approaches to
governance during this "bridge" phase. The applicants argued that
the Constitution did not grant Parliament the authority to establish
non-judicial structures empowered with adjudicatory functions
such as pardoning criminal actors. 2 ° Ultimately, the Court found
that the legislation passed constitutional muster,' 21 but in reaching
its decision, the Court went to great lengths to endorse the Act's
rationale as essential to successful democratic transition. In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Mohamed opened with a compelling
introduction about the harms of the past:
[f]or decades South African history has been dominated by
a deep conflict between a minority which reserved for itself all control over the political instruments of the State
and a majority who sought to resist that domination. Fundamental human rights became a major casualty of this
conflict as the resistance of those punished by their denial
was met by laws designed to counter the effectiveness of
such resistance.... The result was a debilitating war of
internal political dissension and confrontation, massive
tions in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Nicaragua, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 175

(1988).
117. The "epilogue" addresses national unity and reconciliation. S. AFR. CONST. of
1994 National Unity and Reconciliation.
118. S. AFR. CONST. of 1994. The epilogue was dropped from the 1996 Constitution;
however, the preamble provides that the Constitution is adopted so as to "[hjeal the
divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice
and fundamental human rights." S. AFR. CONST. preamble.

119. 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC).
120. Id. at 680.
121. Id. at 692-93.
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expressions of labor militancy, perennial student unrest,
punishing international economic isolation, widespread
dislocation in crucial areas of national endeavor, accelerated levels of armed conflict and a dangerous combination
of anxiety, frustration and anger among expanding proportions of the populace. The legitimacy of law itself was
deeply wounded as the country haemorrhaged [sic] dangerously in the face of this tragic
22 conflict which had begun
to traumatise the entire nation. 1
Justice Mohamed wrote further about the difficulties encountered in building a new democratic order:
[i]t was wisely appreciated by those involved in the ... negotiations [leading to the political detente] that the task of
building such a new democratic order was a very difficult
task because of the previous history and the deep emotions
and indefensible inequities it had generated; and that this
could not be achieved without a firm and generous commitment to reconciliation and national unity. It was
realised that much of the unjust consequences of the past
could not ever be fully reversed. It might be necessary in
crucial areas to close the book on that past.' 23
Perhaps Justice Mohamed placed this extraordinary exposition
so prominently in the opinion in order to render the Court's
reasoning more accessible to lay readers. It identifies political
realities and seeks to build consensus for the conclusions it reaches
by openly embracing amnesty as an essential part of reconciliation.
It acknowledges that the violations suffered by the victims were
neither random nor insignificant, but rather were horrific and
systemic. It suggests that the case raises the issue of how best to
traverse the bridge from the illegitimacy of the past to the rule of
law. It not only accepts that Parliament could address such an issue
as it did in the Truth and Reconciliation bill, but it takes the next
step of endorsing the choice made by Parliament. According to the
Court, Parliament's choice was not only legal, but wise and perhaps
even necessary for a successful transition:
[t]he alternative to the grant of immunity... is to keep intact the abstract right to such a prosecution for particular
persons without the evidence to sustain the prosecution
successfully, to continue to keep the dependents of such

122. Id. at 676.
123. Id.
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victims in many cases substantially ignorant about what
precisely happened to their loved ones... and correspondingly to allow the culprits of such deeds to remain
perhaps physically free but inhibited in their capacity to
become active, full and creative members of the new order ....Both the victims and the culprits who walk on the
"historic bridge" described by the epilogue will hobble
more than walk to the future with heavy and dragged
steps delaying and impeding a rapid and enthusiastic transition to the new society at the end of the bridge, which is
the vision which informs epilogue.'
If the AZAPO case is result-driven, its approach can be justified
by the urgency of navigating a safe passage over the bridge to the
future South Africa.
C. The Court Establishes the Core Values of the Bill of Rights
If some constitutional rights deserve more solicitous judicial
protection than others, how are they selected for such preferential
treatment? The Bill of Rights instructs that judicial interpreters of its
guarantees "must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom."'1' A founding provision of the Constitution declares that
the values upon which the state is based include "human dignity,"
"equality, ....
non-racialism" and "non-sexism. ' 126 A review of the
Court's decisions suggests that the rights to equality, freedom, and
personal security are accorded preferred standing. The opinions
illustrate that the special status results from the history of inequity
and state-sponsored violence that the Bill of Rights was designed to
redress.
Throughout its case law, the Court has repeatedly underscored
the primacy of the equality principle. In one case, Fraserv. Children's
Court, 7 the Court struck down as discriminatory an adoption law
that eliminated the consent requirement for unwed fathers, but not
for unwed mothers. Justice Mohamed wrote that "[tihere can be no
doubt that the guarantee of equality lies at the very heart of the
Constitution. It permeates and defines the very ethos upon which
the Constitution is premised.' ' 28 In Coetzee v. Government of the

124. Id. at 684-85.
125. S. AFR.CONST. § 39(1)(a).
126. S. AFR. CONST. § 1(a)-(b).

127. 1997 (2) SALR 261 (CC).
128. Id. at 272 (footnotes omitted).
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Republic of South Africa, 9 the case challenging the constitutionality of
a law providing for the imprisonment of judgment debtors, one
Justice found the law discriminatory because poor debtors faced
imprisonment while wealthier ones could pursue bankruptcy
proceedings.
Perhaps the most spirited debate on the nature of the equality
right is contained in the Court's Du Plessis131 opinion. In determining
whether the Constitution's free speech clauses applied to private
conduct, the Court also considered whether the Bill of Rights could
be applied horizontally-a subject that had pierced the heart of the
debates that preceded the adoption of the Constitution.'32 In effect,
the horizontality question was one of whether disadvantaged
groups could rely on equal treatment in both the public and private
sphere.133 In a sharply divided opinion, the Court declined to apply
the Bill of Rights to wholly private torts like defamation. In his
opinion for the majority, Justice Kentridge reasoned that the
applicability of constitutional values to private conduct was best left
to be determined incrementally within the framework of the
common law."3 Justices Madala and Kriegler, two of the three
justices in the minority, wrote unusually forceful dissents in which
they argued that the primacy of equality in the Constitution's
structure compelled horizontality."3 In particular, Justice Madala's
opinion suggests that she viewed the outcome as a betrayal of the
constitutional commitment to equality. She noted that "the
verticality approach is unmindful of the modern day reality-that in
many instances the abuse in the exercise of power is perpetrated less
by the State and more by private individuals against other private
individuals. 1 36 Ultimately, the Constitution's silence on the issue
left it up to the Court to decide which, 1if37 any, provisions of the Bill of
Rights should be applied horizontally.

129. 1995 (4) SALR 631 (CC).
concurring).
130. Id. at 670 (Sachs, J.,
131. Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SALR 850 (CC).
132. Id. at 860-61.
133. For a discussion of the feminist view that full equality for women requires
"deprivatizing" offenses like domestic violence, and attention to other forms of discrimination within the home, see, for example, Vivienne Goldberg, South Africa:
Private Law in Transition/ The Effect of the New Constitution,33 U. LOUISVILLE J.FAM. L.
495, 496-500 (1995); Celina Romany, Black Women and Gender Equality in a New South
Africa: Human Rights Law and the Intersection of Race and Gender, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
857,870-76 (1996).
134. Du Plessis, 1996 (3) SALR at 885.
135. Id. at 908-27.
136. Id. at 922.
137. The Constitution states that "[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or
a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the na-

MichiganJournalof Race & Law

[VOL 3:29

Apart from equality, the Court has focused on the crisis of endemic violence that has plagued the country as well as its
implications regarding enforcement of the right to freedom and personal security. The Court has remained steadfastly committed to the
principle that violence sanctioned by the state engenders disrespect
for law and authority. For example, in rejecting the argument that
the death penalty is necessary for deterrence, the Court observed
that the• root
.• 138 causes of violence could be found in inequitable social
conditions. The death penalty, the Court concluded, was not a
remedy for such conditions.! Likewise, in State v. Williams, ° the
case banning the caning of juvenile offenders, the Court expressed
similar views regarding the need for the State to protect liberty and
personal security of all of its citizens, even in the face of the crime
epidemic.
D. The Interdependenceof Civil and PoliticalRights,
and Economic, Social, and CulturalRights
The Court has shown little hesitance in expressing its perspective on the relationship between social and economic conditions and
the exercise of civil rights.' It has clearly indicated its recognition of

ture of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right." S. AFR. CONST. §
8(2).
138. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC). Justice Chaskalson observed that
[tihe cause of the high incidence of violent crime cannot simply be attributed to the failure to carry out the death sentences imposed by the
courts. The upsurge in violent crime came at a time of great social
change associated with political turmoil and conflict.... Homelessness,
unemployment, poverty and frustration consequent upon such conditions are other causes of the crime wave.
Id. at 442-43.
139. Id. at 441-45.
140. 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
141. As to the propriety of expanding constitutional rights to include second generation economic, social and cultural rights, and third generation environmental
rights, see, for example, David M. Davis, The Case Against the Inclusion of SocioEconomic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except as Directive Principles,8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs.
475, 486-88 (1992); Nicholas Haysom, Constitutionalism,MajoritarianDemocracy and
Socio-Economic Rights, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 451, 456-60 (1992); Rhoda Howard, The
Full Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil and Political Rights?
Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HuM. RTS. Q., 467, 482-87 (1983); Herman
Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitution?10 AM. U.S. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1233 (1995); Craig Scott & Patrick Macklem, ConstitutionalRopes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees?Social Rights in a New South African Constitution,141 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
43-85 (1992); Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights: Why Social and Economic Rights
Don't Belong in the Constitutionsof Post-CommunistEurope, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Winter

1993, at 35. Some commentators who support the expansion of constitutional entitlements to include second generation rights nevertheless worry that the courts are not
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class bias embedded in the law. In so doing, it has alerted the legal
community of the need to revamp legal structures that perpetuate
inequity. In Fraserv. Children's Court,"' Justice Mohamed went so far
as to caution Parliament to be aware of the potentially discriminatory consequences of its lawmaking. 43 Justice Mohamed addressed
the issue of equality in the following manner:
[t]he question of parental rights in relation to adoption
bears directly on the question of gender equality. In
considering appropriate legislative alternatives, parliament
should be acutely sensitive to the deep disadvantage
experienced by the single mothers in our society. Any
legislative initiative should not exacerbate
that
disadvantage. In seeking to avoid doing so, it may well be
that the legislative approaches adopted in "first-world"
countries.., should be viewed with caution. The socioeconomic and historical factors which give rise to gender
inequality in South Africa are not always the same as those
in... "first-world" countries.4
In Mohlomi v. Minister of Defence,"5 Justice Didcott wrote
compellingly about the need to be cognizant of the poverty-based
impediments to civic and democratic participation. In that case, the
applicants challenged the constitutionality of a short statute of
limitations for claims against the State." 6 Critical of the statute's
consequences for poor and unsophisticated litigants, Justice Didcott
wrote "[t]hat disparity must be viewed against the background
depicted by the state of affairs prevailing in South Africa, a land
where poverty and illiteracy abound and differences of culture and
language are pronounced, where such conditions isolate the people
whom they handicap from the mainstream of the law .... . 7
In this manner, the Court has contextualized its rights
jurisprudence by demonstrating that poverty defines the way in
which individuals experience rights. This point is illustrated in

institutionally prepared to enforce such rights. See LORD MCCLUSKEY, LAW, JUSTICE

AND DEMOCRACY 38 (1987). In the South African case, as a practical matter the issue is
moot, because the Constitution does in fact contain guarantees of positive economic
and social rights, including the right of access to housing, health care, education, and a

safe environment. See S. AFR. CONST. §§ 24, 26, 27, 29.
142. 1997 (2) SALR 261 (CC).
143. Id. at 283.
144. Id. at 282.

145. 1997 (1) SALR 124 (CC).
146. Id. at 126.
147. Id. at 131.
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Coetzee v. Government of the Republic of South Africa, "' a case in which
the Court declined to accept the facial neutrality of the law requiring
the imprisonment of judgment debtors. Instead, the Court looked
beyond the text to identify the law's operational bias against the
poor and ruled the statute unconstitutional for granting the right of
judicial review of one's financial status to the bankruptcy litigant
but not to the poor debtor.49 In Gauteng School Education Bill of
1995,'s° where the Court considered whether linguistic minorities
enjoy a group right to state-supported separate schools, the jurists
refused to accept at face value the claim that the state owed a duty to
protect a numerical minority by underwriting cultural segregation.""
Rather, the Court drew a distinction between the rights entitlement
of various groups based on the prior history of disadvantage.5 2
CONCLUSION
Many complex issues continue to confront the South African
Constitutional Court, and many textual silences have yet to be
addressed. However, a review of the Court's work to date
establishes that reliable methods of adjudication-transparency,
contextualization, and comparative study-are firmly entrenched in
the South African legal system. As the Constitutional Court of South
Africa develops its jurisprudence in the aftermath of the social,
political, and judicial changes, proper use of these tools will
continue to enable the country, through its adjudicative processes, to
assume its place among the preeminent constitutional democracies
of the world.

148. 1995 (4) SALR 631 (CC).
149. Id. at 641-44.

150. 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC).
151. Id. at 191.
152. Id. at 173.

